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Global imbalances, saving glut and investment strike
Gilles MOËC                Laure FREY
Macro analysis and forecasting directorate
Global macroeconomic outlook division
The present state of the global economy is characterised by persistent and increasingly polarised current account imbalances, 
in a context of historically low long-term interest rates, which stand below the equilibrium levels proxied by potential growth and 
trend inﬂ  ation. A comprehensive analysis by Ben Bernanke1 attributes those two phenomena to one common cause: a global 
saving glut outside the United States. 
The approach below is more pessimistic than the global saving glut theory as far as the diagnosis is concerned, as the most 
striking feature of the present state of the global economy is not so much a saving glut as an investment strike, in spite of low 
long-term interest rates. 
This also affects the US economy where corporate investment remains subdued relative to proﬁ  ts, adding to the gradual loss in its 
tradable productive capacity, possibly to the beneﬁ  t of large foreign direct investment outﬂ  ows. So far, such a model could be seen 
as sustainable. Indeed, in spite of an increasingly large deterioration in the US net international investment position, the balance 
of income has remained positive owing to a favourable yield spread between assets and liabilities. However, the tipping point, 
beyond which net investment income turns negative and therefore becomes a levy on domestic resources, seems to be near.
This may lead to serious foreign debt sustainability issues and reinforces the “steep exchange rate adjustment” exit scenario 
with all its potentially harmful side effects. Recently, some optimistic assessments of exchange-rate-led adjustment have focused 
on valuation effects, through which a large amount of the US net foreign debt could be wiped out by a US dollar depreciation. 
We suggest that such an exchange rate shock would be likely to trigger an increase in US interest rates, which makes an exchange 
rate shock not as painless as it seems for the US economy. Besides, such a shock could be potentially more harmful than previous 
episodes of sharp US dollar adjustment from the perspective of the global economy, as the ratio of foreign-owned assets in the 
United States to the world GDP has tripled since the mid-1980s.
However, as far as the other exit strategies are concerned, the approach below is more optimistic: since economic policies had a 
signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence on the run-up to the current situation of low interest rates/global imbalances, reorienting economic policies 
may successfully address the issues at stake, leading to a gradual policy-driven resolution process which could be less disruptive 
than a market-led adjustment.
The note is organised as follows: section 1 provides a brief summary of the mechanisms and implications of the “saving glut 
hypothesis”; section 2 discusses the accuracy of the saving glut hypothesis by looking at savings and investment behaviour in various 
economic regions; section 3 focuses on the saving/investment balance in the corporate sector, particularly in the United States, 
and the shift to the rent economy hypothesis and ﬁ  nally section 4 outlines various possible adjustment mechanisms of the global 
imbalances/low interest rates combination. 
1  “The Global Saving Glut and the US Current Account Deficit”; remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke at the Sandridge Lecture, Viginia Association of Economics, Richmond, 10 March 2005.2  Banque de France • Occasional papers • No. 1 • February 2006
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1|  The global saving glut 
hypothesis: a comprehensive 
and attractive explanation, 
though supplying little 
  policy options in the short run
The low level of long-term interest rates in the global 
economy – which may be labelled as “abnormal” with 
respect to crude measures of equilibrium interest rates 
using trend inflation and potential GDP estimates 
– is often referred to as a “conundrum”. Among the 
classical explanations for this situation one may 
find: 1) greater central banks’ credibility, allowing 
for better anchored inflation expectations; 2) lower 
macroeconomic volatility; 3) availability of a wider 
range of financial products supplying protection 
against risks.
If these explanations clearly help to account for 
the decreasing trend in long-term interest rates 
observed for the last 15 years, they usually fail to 
explain some other surprising features of the current 
state of the world economy, including 1) lasting and 
increasingly polarised current account imbalances, 2) 
housing prices rising faster than interest rate adjusted 
affordability measures in a fair number of countries, 
3) declining yields spreads on sovereign debt in the 
emerging countries. 
In contrast, the global saving glut hypothesis (GSG) 
provides a common explanation for all these surprising 
features. It could be summarised as follows: outside 
the United States, lending capacities have increased, 
due to 1) lower investment opportunities in the mature 
economies and 2) higher desired level of national 
savings in the developing and emerging economies, the 
latter phenomenon being attributed to a precautionary 
attitude in the wake of the financial crises of the 
1980s/1990s in Latin America and Asia. According to 
the global saving glut theory, the first factor has played 
only a minor role, as the bulk of the increase in foreign 
saving directed towards the United States has come 
from the developing and emerging world. 
In the late 1990s, the higher non-US lending capacities 
met higher demand for funds from the US corporate 
sector at a time when a shift in the productivity pace 
in the US warranted higher return on investment on 
this market. This led to a steep rise in equity prices 
which in turn fed a significant wealth effect for 
US households. This may explain part of the decrease 
in the US households saving rate and deterioration in 
the US current account. After 2000, the role of “global 
spender in last resort” shifted from the US business 
sector to the US general government. Accordingly, the 
impact of the “global saving glut” on financial markets 
shifted from the equity to the fixed-income markets, 
triggering a decrease in long-term interest rates which 
also impacted the household saving rates through 
an increase in housing prices. The mechanisms are 
summarised in the table below. 
A “side-effect” of this “saving glut” mechanism is the 
decrease in the level of financial risk in the emerging 
world, as shown by the fall in yields spreads on 
sovereign debt: many countries previously prone to 
financial crises have built up significant “war chests” 
by increasing their official reserves in the context 
of an export-led growth strategy preventing any 
exchange-rate appreciation. 
Yet, the global saving glut analysis does not 
describe a “brave new world” in which this new 
organisation of capital flows can be considered 
as an optimal international allocation of savings, 
“à la” Folkerts-Landau Dooley Garber.2 It takes into 
The global saving glut mechanisms
Outside the United States In the United States
Higher net lending
Higher borrowing from 
US corporate sector 
Rising proﬁ  t expectations
Higher equity prices
(second half of 90s)
Positive ﬁ  nancial 
wealth effect Lower household saving 
rate and higher current 
account deﬁ  cit Higher borrowing from 
the US government 
sector
Higher bond prices
(ﬁ  rst half of 2000s)
Wealth effect through 
higher house prices + 
MEWs
2  See “Living with Bretton Woods II”, M. Dooley, D. Folkerts-Landau, P. Garber, Deutsche Bank Global Markets Research, 20 September 2005.Banque de France • Occasional papers • No. 1 • February 2006  3
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account that, in a more normal pattern, advanced 
economies, among which the United States, should 
display current account surpluses so as to lend funds to 
emerging and developing countries. Besides, the risks 
such a “system” may pose for the mature economies 
are highlighted. As stated, “an allocation of savings 
which favours housing investment might be conducive to 
lower potential growth”, as “in the long run, productivity 
gains are more likely to be driven by non-residential 
investment, such as purchases of new machines”. 
While mentioning the potential long run damages 
of this “model”, the GSG does not provide policy 
makers with any options in order to address these 
global imbalances. The one policy option frequently 
discussed, i.e. a more stringent fiscal policy in the 
United States, is even discarded as 1) GSG clears 
US fiscal policy of any major responsibility in the 
causes of the global imbalances and 2) in this model, 
higher government savings in the United States would 
further depress interest rates, fuelling an additional 
decrease in household savings. The solution therefore 
lies, according to the GSG, in a structural change in 
emerging countries’ savings/investment behaviour. 
This would gradually occur as they acquire the full 
status of market economies with flexible exchange 
rates and financial liberalisation.
2| “Saving  glut” 
or “investment strike”: 
a geographical perspective
2|1 “Global saving glut” 
or “investment strike” 
from a global point of view
Previous works on this subject often rely on the 
presentation of the international flow of funds in 
PPP terms, in line with the IMF’s approach until 
the September 2005 WEO. As the emerging Asian 
countries, and in particular China, account for a much 
larger share of world GDP in PPP terms than in current 
US dollar terms, the impact of their saving/investment 
behaviour on global patterns has consequently been 
magnified. Using current US dollar data, as we have 
done in the calculations below, seems more relevant 
when dealing with international financial markets 
balances, since what matters is the actual amount of 
available funds. 
The starting point of the global saving glut analysis 
is the emergence of a net lending capacity outside 
the United States. Indeed, according to the IMF 
data, the world’s net lending capacity (excluding the 
United States) has displayed a clearly positive trend 
since the 1990s (see chart 1). 
In itself, such a calculation shows nothing more 
than the fact that the United States has displayed an 
increasing net borrowing requirement against the 
rest of the world. Yet, what may be of interest is the 
cause of this increase in the net lending capacity of 
the rest of the world, i.e. whether it corresponds to a 
Chart 1  Net lending capacity (World excluding the US)













Sources: IMF WEO, Banque de France calculations
Chart 2  World saving and investment rates 
(excluding the US)
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Investment rate (excl. the US)
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downward trend in investment or an upward trend in 
saving. Chart 2 provides such a breakdown, showing 
that global savings (excluding the United States) have 
indeed increased over the last decade, but the level 
seen in 2004 is by no means an unprecedented level. 
Contrary to the GSG assumption, an unprecedented 
low level of investment outside the US explains the 
bulk of the increase in global net lending. 
2|2 “Global saving glut” 
and “investment strike” 
in the major economic regions
Using the IMF data, we drew up a “savings and 
investment” balance for 6 major economic regions 
(the US, the Euro Area, Japan, Emerging Asia excluding 
Chart 3  National saving and investment rates
(in% of area related GDP)
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China, Emerging Asia including China, and finally the 
oil producing countries), over the past 10 years. 
The decrease in the global investment rate outside the 
United States – whose current account deterioration 
since the cyclical downturn of 2001 stems chiefly from 
a steep decrease in the national saving rate – cannot 
entirely be attributed to the mature economies, with 
all emerging economies maintaining their investment 
rates and increasing their savings rates, as implied 
by the GSG. 
True, Japan and the Euro area have displayed a clear 
pattern of “investment strike”, since the mid-1990s in 
Japan and since 2001 in the Euro area, but emerging Asia 
excluding China has also displayed a sharp decrease in the 
investment rate. In the latter area, even if the investment 
rate has lately recovered, it still remains in 2005 almost 10 
GDP points below the 1995 level. This area saving rate 
did not increase in reaction to the financial crises in 
the second half of the 1990s, as suggested by the GSG. 
The area saving rate actually remained surprisingly 
stable, but investment rate decreased, following the 
prescriptions of most observers of the Asian crisis, 
who attributed the main cause of the crisis to capital 
over-accumulation, in a context of insufficient 
investment discrimination. Even when China is taken 
into account (but note that China was not directly 
affected by the Asian financial crisis), the investment 
rate has not yet returned to its mid-1990s level (34.4% 
in 2005 against 36.2% in 1995), even if it now stands at 
3 GDP points over the 1980-1995 average. In emerging 
Asia including China, net lending capacities have 
actually remained fairly stable as a share of GDP 
since the 1997/1998 financial crisis, as savings and 
investment profiles have been remarkably similar. 
The picture might change when it will be possible 
to integrate the recent Chinese national account 
revisions.
A clearer case of saving glut can be found in the oil 
producing countries. Faced with limited domestic 
absorption capacities, these countries responded to 
the recent sharp increase in oil prices by significantly 
increasing their saving rate. 
Note that these findings are similar to those of the IMF 
in the analytical part of the last WEO3 except for one 
significant issue: the saving/investment behaviour of the 
Euro area. According to the WEO, Euro area net lending 
stood at 2.0% of GDP in 2004. This figure is at odds 
with the IMF figure for the Euro area current account 
balance (0.5% of GDP). Even when correcting for the 
capital account, the difference remains huge. Besides, 
such a wide discrepancy could not be found for the 
US (0.5% of GDP) or Japan (0.0% of GDP). We therefore 
did not use the IMF Euro area aggregate data in the 
charts above; instead, we preferred to sum individual 
member countries savings and investment data. By so 
doing, the saving/investment gap we have computed 
stands at 0.6% of Euro area GDP, much closer to the 
current account surplus figure. This discussion is not 
anecdotal in so far as, expressed in current USD, the gap 
between the IMF data and ours in terms of net lending 
capacities stood at USD 130 bns in 2004, roughly one 
fifth of the US current account deficit. The gap may 
stem from exchange-rate conversion techniques 
used at the IMF to compute Euro area aggregates.
This brings us to a central issue: in terms of global 
imbalances, what matters, beyond the saving and 
investment behaviours of individual regions, is their 
relative size, and hence their respective contribution 
to the financing of the US current account deficit. 
Chart 4 shows the distribution of current account 
balances across these areas in USD billions.
Chart 4  Current account balances
(in USD billions)
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Emerging Asia (Excluding China) (a)
Euro Area












United States (reversed sign)
China
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(a) Deﬁ   ned as Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaisia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand
Source: IMF WEO
(b) Ten top oil producers (Algeria, Kuwait, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela)
Source: IMF WEO
3  See “Global saving and investment: the current state of play”, IMF World Economic Outlook, September 2005.6  Banque de France • Occasional papers • No. 1 • February 2006
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Observers often focus their attention on the role of 
China, namely because the bilateral trade surplus with 
the US accounts for a large share of the US total trade 
deficit. However, its total current account surplus has 
been constantly smaller than that of the rest of emerging 
Asia’s or Japan from the financial crisis of 1997/1998 
until 2004. China has certainly played a central role in 
the run-up to global imbalances, however not because 
of its domestic saving/investment imbalance per 
se, but rather because of its specific combination 
of domestic financial under-development, fixed 
exchang-rate policy and short-term speculative capital 
inflows. This combinaison ultimately led to a steep 
increase in official reserves which in turn contributes 
to maintaining US  interest rates at low level.4
More generally, we distributed current account 
surpluses among “investment strikers” (i.e. Japan, 
the Euro area and emerging Asia excluding 
China) and “savings gluttons” (i.e. oil producers 
and China). It appears (see chart  5) that, in 
terms of total current account surpluses, the first 
group was outpaced by the second group in 2005 
only, due to the additional increase in oil prices. 
3| Investment strike in the 
corporate sector: from a net 
borrowing requirement to a 
net lending capacity
In this context of global investment strike, a widely 
popular view is that the United States is not only the 
“consumer in last resort” but also is the “investor in 
last resort” as it offers better investment opportunities 
thanks to its strong productivity growth. This may not 
be as clear-cut, and we might wonder why US business 
investment, relative to profits, is far from having fully 
recovered from the 2001 adjustment, in spite of lower 
interest rates. 
3|1 In the US, a new combination 
  of subdued domestic investment, 
low attractiveness to foreign 
investment and corporate 
aggressiveness as regard 
operational extension abroad
Faced with financial imbalances which built up during 
the bubble years, US firms quickly managed to record 
high levels of profitability, thanks to an aggressive action 
on labour costs. Nevertheless, business investment has 
not yet picked up as rapidly as profits. Consequently, 
the US non-financial corporate sector has recently 
displayed an unprecedented net lending capacity 
(chart 6), contrary to textbook wisdom (see appendix 
for more details on calculations and figures). 
True, a large share of this increase in net lending 
can probably be viewed as an offset to the significant 
deterioration in the firms’ financial situation during 
the bubble years. Yet, in a context of historically low 
borrowing costs and, conversely, high opportunity 
Chart 5  Current account surplus by areas 
with common saving / investment behaviours
(in USD billions)
Areas in savings glut
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Sources: IMF WEO, Banque de France calculations
4  See “US long-term yields and forex intervention by foreign central banks”, L . Frey and G. Moëc, Banque de France Monthly Digest No. 137, May 2005.
Chart 6  Non-farm non-ﬁ  nancial corporate 
business net lending / borrowing
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costs of saving, such a willingness of US firms to 
achieve a position of net lending capacity remains 
somewhat surprising. Furthermore, it appears 
that in 2000, both Euro area and US non-financial 
firms displayed a similar net borrowing position. 
In 2004 (latest comparable year), US firms posted a 
significantly positive net lending position, whereas 
firms in the Euro area remained in the (usual) 
borrowing requirement position (chart 7). What then 
made the US firms more willing than their European 
counterparts to display such an investment restraint 
(relative to profits)?
This specific American firms’ appetite for large 
positive net lending cannot be more easily explained 
by a particularly high debt burden. Chart 8 provides 
a harmonised comparison of non-financial corporate 
debt in the United States, Japan and the Euro area. 
In spite of the “new economy” bubble in the late 
1990s, US firms did not increase their leverage as 
much as firms in the Euro area. In 2005, according 
to preliminary data, US non-financial corporate debt 
was 15 GDP points below the level recorded in the 
Euro area. 
This low level of capital expenditures relative to profits 
has been commonly acknowledged by the Federal 
Reserve officials. In his report to the Congress in 
July 2005, Alan Greenspan mentions it while referring 
to another kind of possible explanation, i.e. the 
cautious attitude of business. “Although corporate 
capital investment in the major industrial countries rose 
in recent years, it apparently failed to match increases 
in corporate cash flow. In the United States, for example, 
capital expenditures were below the very substantial level 
of corporate cash flow in 2003, the first shortfall since the 
severe recession of 1975. That development was likely 
a result of the business caution that was apparent in 
the wake of the stock market decline and the corporate 
scandals early this decade.” 5 
However, what is striking when looking at flow of 
funds data for the US non-financial corporate sector 
is that US firms have been cautious at home, while 
being rather aggressive on the foreign markets and 
unattractive to foreign investors. Indeed, it appears 
that a large part of these unusual financing capacities 
were used to fund direct investment abroad. 
The net FDIs profile changed sharply at the time of 
the bubble burst (chart 9). This first chiefly stemmed 
from a sharp drop in the FDIs inflows, from a peak 
in 2000 at 2.5% of GDP to less than 0.5% of GDP 
from 2002 onward. This was eventually relayed by 
a recovery in US FDIs outflows, from 1.0% of GDP 
at the end of 2002 to 2.0% of GDP in 2004, twice 
the long-term average and close to the record level 
observed at the peak of the cycle, in 2000.Such a shift 
is puzzling if one assumes that profitability in the 
United States, based on a faster productivity pace, is 
significantly higher than in the rest of the advanced 
economies. Indeed, we may consider FDIs inflows 
in the non-financial corporate sector as an indicator 
of domestic attractiveness and FDIs outflows as an 
Chart 7  Non-ﬁ  nancial corporate net lending
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5  Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan “Federal Reserve Board’s semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress”, before the committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of 
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indicator of domestic firms’ willingness to expand 
their operational activities abroad. Thus, net FDIs may 
be a powerful indicator, at the aggregate level, of the 
global appraisal of corporations, both domestic and 
foreign, of the expected relative long-term operational 
profitability of a particular location.
The fact that net US equities outflows have been 
positive since 2003 reinforces our assumption that 
domestic and foreign investors are looking for higher 
corporate profitability outside the United States. 
Overall, on a balance of payment basis, net US FDIs 
outflows6 are not offset by net equity inflows but are 
being financed on fixed income markets (chart 10).
At the non-financial corporate level, a “corrected” 
measure of net lending, designed to take these 
phenomena into account, i.e. internal funds less capital 
expenditure, minus net FDIs, is currently negative in 
the United States (chart 11). In the first two quarters 
of 2005, this “corrected” net lending ratio stood very 
close to the historically low levels observed in the last 
years of the 1990s “bubble”.
It is worth trying to establish whether the massive 
movement of foreign development by US  firms 
is a substitute for domestic investment or merely 
complements it. If the second proposition is true, then 
the particular feature of the US non-financial corporate 
sector net lending can be seen as healthy, as firms 
would prove to be profitable enough to increase their 
capital base both at home and overseas. Conversely, 
if the first proposition is true, while it may lead to an 
equivalent global capacity production at firms’ level, 
it makes a difference at the aggregate level on the 
US territory, and the United States would be faced with 
a diminishing domestic productive base which may, 
among other painful consequences, raise the issue of 
the sustainability of serving the foreign debt. 
Chart 9  Net US foreign direct investments (FDIs)




























Sources: Flow of funds, Banque de France calculations
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Source: BEA
Chart 11  Non-farm non-ﬁ  nancial corporate 
business net lending / borrowing
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(Gross saving-capex)
Net lending excluding FDI (Gross saving-capex-net FDI)
Sources: Flow of funds, Banque de France calculations
6  Note that net FDIs inflows, in BoP data, are positive in 2005 for the whole US economy, because outflows decreased sharply in the third quarter, due to temporary fiscal exemptions 
leading to a drop in reinvested earnings of US foreign affiliates. Remember that chart 9 only concerns the non-financial corporate sector, using flow of funds data, so that the figures 
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To provide a preliminary assessment of this issue, 
chart 12 plots 1) the “classic” investment ratio of 
the US non-financial corporate sector, 2) a “corrected” 
investment ratio, adding net FDIs outflows to Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) and 3) the output gap 
calculated by the OECD. This calculation may raise 
two issues: first, the “economic legitimacy” of the 
GFCF/FDI identity and second, the use of net FDIs.
First, in national accounting, FDIs are considered as 
a form of financial saving (“net financial acquisitions” 
in US flow of funds data). Yet, at an individual firm 
level, a FDI operation might be similar to a gross 
fixed capital formation operation in terms of total 
productive capacity. Second, we use net FDIs because 
inflows have to be taken into account, as a share of 
these inflows is likely to have a positive impact on 
domestic investment (e.g a foreign company building 
a plant in the United States), offsetting some of the 
substitution effect of FDIs outflows on domestic 
investment.
It appears that, for the first half of  2005, the 
“corrected” measure displays a pattern that is fairly 
in line with a typical recovery period, whereas the 
“classic” investment rate is clearly below the usual 
level in times of closing output gaps, which suggests 
the “substitution” theory might well explain the 
current orientation of corporate investment in the 
United States. 
A more in-depth analysis of the impact this specific 
feature of corporate investment has on global 
capacity production would require distinguishing 
between brownfield and greenfield FDIs. Whereas 
the consequence is the same for the US domestic 
productive base, i.e. a decrease, it does make 
a difference at the scale of the global production 
capacities. Indeed, greenfield FDIs would accrue global 
capacity production while brownfield FDIs involve 
existing production assets. Nevertheless, American 
statistics on FDIs do not allow us to make a difference 
between greenfield and brownfield FDIs.
Besides, these calculations are naturally much cruder 
than the more refined indicators used in the literature 
on domestic/foreign investment substituability. 
Two contradictory papers are usually cited on this 
issue. The first, by Martin Feldstein7, using panel 
data analysis for OECD countries, finds a strong 
substitution effect, as “each dollar of cross-border 
flow of foreign direct investment reduces domestic 
investment by approximately one dollar”. The second, 
by Desai, Foley and Hines8, finds a positive relationship 
between FDIs and domestic investment in a sample of 
US multinational companies, using the BEA Survey of 
US direct investment abroad. In the latter case, which 
concludes that there is a complementary relationship, 
it is worth noting that the survey covers (in annual 
data) 21 years up to 2003, so that a recent shift in the 
relationship may not be taken into account. Besides, 
the scope of our calculations, which covers the whole 
non-financial corporate sector, differs from their more 
limited sample. 
In any case, we may discuss the “low domestic 
attractiveness / high foreign aggressiveness of the US 
non-financial corporate sector” and subdued 
investment story in light of the gradual shrinkage 
of the US tradable sector. Obviously, we are over-
simplistic when we identify the non-tradable sectors 
with manufacturing, as an increasingly large share 
of services can actually be traded internationally. 
However, a striking feature of the current US cycle is 
the shift in output composition from manufacturing 
to services and the housing sectors (see charts 13a 
and 13b). 
Chart 12  Capital expenditures, FDIs 
(non-farm non-ﬁ  nancial corporate business) 
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Output gap (OECD, right-hand scale)
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Sources: OECD, BEA, Federal Reserve System, Banque de France 
calculations
7  “The effects of outbound foreign investment on the domestic capital stock”, NBER working paper No. 4668, March 1994.
8  “Foreign direct investment and the domestic capital stock”, NBER working paper No. 11075, January 2005.10  Banque de France • Occasional papers • No. 1 • February 2006
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Against that background, a comparison between the 
recoveries following the 1991 and 2001 recessions 
is very instructive. After the 1991 recession, real 
value added recovered rapidly in all sectors and 
growth was evenly distributed across the economy. 
Indeed, the real value added of all sectors was above 
its peak level as soon as one year after the trough. 
Conversely, while there was no contraction in terms 
of real value added in the private services sector 
in 2001, it took three years after the trough for the 
manufacturing real value added to return to its peak 
level. Furthermore, the “traditional” manufacturing 
sector, defined as manufacturing excluding computer 
and electronic products, has not recovered yet from 
the 2001 recession.
The shrinkage of manufacturing in terms of employment 
is even more striking and seems to follow a structural 
rather than cyclical pattern. During the 1991 recession, 
the drop in employment was far more pronounced in 
the manufacturing sector than in the other sectors, 
and there was no recovery thereafter in this sector, but 
rather a stabilisation. During the 2001 recession, the 
decline in employment was even more focused on the 
manufacturing sector, was sharper and lasted longer. 
It may be noted that, as opposed to the developments in 
real value added, the computer and electronic products 
sector did not act as a buffer for the manufacturing 
sector as a whole. This sub-sector indeed accounted for 
20% of the net job destructions that occurred in 2002 
and 2003. This development can be linked to the solid 
productivity gains in the ICT sector. While this sector 
has undoubtedly contributed strongly to the overall 
US economic dynamism, it has not contributed to 
boosting employment.
Chart 13a  US value added by sector evolution after 1991 and 2001 recessions (real growth)
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Chart 13b  US employment by sector evolution after 1991 and 2001 recessions
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3|2 Is this sustainable?
A benign interpretation of the US domestic/foreign 
investment substitution would see the United States 
shifting from a production to a rent economy 
model, servicing its external debt with the income 
from its foreign investment. Such an interpretation 
focuses on the US income balance paradox. Indeed, 
although the US net international investment position 
has turned negative at the end of the 1980s and 
has sharply deteriorated since the mid-1990s, net 
international investment receipts have remained 
positive (see chart 14) because the rate of return on 
US liabilities has been lower than  that on US assets. 
This is largely due to the fact that the average rate 
of return on US outward FDIs is particularly high 
(circa 7% if assets are priced at market value, circa 
10% if they are priced at current cost), whereas the 
US growth in liabilities over the last few years has 
chiefly consisted in very low yielding fixed-income 
products. Gourinchas and Rey have recently proposed 
a striking expression, labelling the United States as 
the “world venture capitalist”9.
As long as the US corporate investment abroad 
remains sufficiently profitable, such a FDIs/domestic 
investment substitution model may be sustainable 
since the deterioration in the net international 
investment position does not lead to a levy on 
US resources. Besides, it can be argued that the 
positive impact on US growth, stemming from an 
efficient international organisation of production, 
namely through an increase in the purchasing power 
of US consumers, may contribute to stabilising the net 
foreign debt to GDP ratio. 
However, the US income balance paradox may shortly 
be resolved. As the outstanding amount of US assets 
held by foreigners largely exceeds the outstanding 
amount of foreign assets held by US residents10, the 
US balance of income may turn negative even if 
the US domestic yields are relatively low. Indeed, 
the rate of return on US liabilities increased in 2004 
(see chart 15), since US government and private yields 
stopped decreasing while the rate of return on FDIs11 
in the United States increased. We have calculated an 
“equilibrium rate” which computes the rate of return 
of US liabilities beyond which the balance of income 
turns negative, taking into account the respective size 
of total US assets and liabilities. Since the end of the 
1990s, this equilibrium rate has been very close to the 
actual rate. Overall, the US balance on income has 
turned slightly negative in the second quarter of 2005, 
following the (relatively small on average over the whole 
yield curve) increase in US domestic interest rates.
Our calculations, suggesting we are close to the 
“tipping point” for the US income balance, yield 
the same conclusions as a recent paper by Higgins, 
9  See “From world banker to world venture capitalist”. NBER working paper No 11563, August 2005. 
10  At the end of 2004, foreigners owned 12.5 USD trillion worth of assets in the US, 2.5 USD trillion more than the value of US-owned assets abroad.
11  According to a CBO study, “Why does US investment abroad earn higher returns than foreign investment in the United States” (November 2005), the US subsidiaries abroad having 
been generally in business longer than foreign-owned subsidiaries in the US is part of the explanation of their greater profitability. Nevertheless, this impact is due to be transitory.
Chart 15  US assets and liabilities rates of return
(in%)
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Sources: BEA, Banque de France calculations
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Klitgaard and Tille12, Note that, along the same lines 
as in their paper, we define rates of returns as the ratio 
of income streams to the assets value, neglecting the 
impact of capital gains/losses on asset values. This is 
primarily explained by the fact that valuation effects 
are not recorded in the current account figures, but 
we address the issue of valuation effects in the last 
section of this paper, as the observers’ attention has 
recently been drawn on these issues in relation to an 
exchange-rate-led adjustment of global imbalances.
In terms of stocks, a solution for the United States, in 
case no trade rebalancing occurs, would be to draw on 
existing assets to finance the current account deficit. 
According to official data, as the US net investment 
position is negative, this would not be a lasting 
solution. This view has recently been challenged 
with the “dark matter” hypothesis13, which suggests 
that the US stock of assets overseas is actually far 
larger than officially acknowledged, considering that 
US foreign capital valuation does not take into account 
the transfer of particular know how, management 
skills or technological standards. Without discussing 
these assumptions as such, one may wonder if such 
a financing of the current account, i.e. selling assets 
to keep the deficit rolling is a) healthy and b) feasible, 
as the value of US foreign assets would undoubtedly 
shrink if their US owners decided to sell them, thus 
severing the link to better know how, management 
skills or technological standards. 
4|  Exit strategies: the sharp 
exchange rate adjustment, 
the Asian conversion 
and the multi-faceted 
policy-led approach
4|1 The sharp exchange rate adjustment
A significant downward adjustment of the US dollar 
should be a natural outcome of the US situation, if no 
policy measures are taken. Indeed, the United States 
will have to face its inter-temporal budget constraint 
and yield current surpluses to service the increasing 
external debt. 
With a productive structure shifting away from the 
tradable to the non-tradable sector, the exchange rate 
adjustment might have to be particularly strong. Indeed, 
it is likely that the “income channel” (i.e. improved 
balance of income thanks to the lower US dollar) 
may have a somewhat stronger impact on the current 
account than the “trade channel” (i.e. improved 
competitiveness owing to the lower US dollar), as the 
recent responsiveness of US trade patterns to exchange 
rate movements has been particularly weak. This may 
help to understand why US policy-makers insist on an 
appreciation of emerging Asian currencies: the trade 
channel impact would be subdued, as the bilateral 
relationship is deeply unbalanced (US exports to this 
region are particularly low), but the income channel 
could be stronger, as this region is absorbing a large 
share of US FDIs. 
Two scenarios help to provide an assessment of the 
impact of an exchange rate shock on the balance of 
income. In a first one (see table 1 in box page 13), 
the exchange rate shock would have no effect on the 
relative rates of return of US assets and liabilities. 
We therefore simply apply the initial rate of return on 
the value of US gross assets in the rest of the world 
increased by the change in the US dollar exchange 
rate (assuming all US  owned foreign assets are 
denominated in foreign currencies). The US current 
account deficit would in this case be reduced by some 
10% (in reality, the impact would be smaller, as a share 
of US-owned assets abroad is denominated in dollars) 
(USD 75 billions) owing to the income channel, to which 
the usual trade competitiveness impact would add. 
However, we consider that it would be unrealistic to 
suppose that a significant decline in the US dollar 
value would bear no effect on the rates of return. 
In response to such a decline in their portfolio value, 
computed in their domestic currency, international 
investors would demand an increase in the rate of 
return that the United States has to pay to the rest of the 
world. Furthermore, such a rate of return adjustment 
would be consistent with the monetary policy reaction 
triggered by the increase in imported inflation 
induced by the US dollar depreciation. The second 
scenario (see table 2 in box page 13) simulates such a 
combination of lower US dollar exchange rate/ higher 
US interest rates. To gauge the likely impact of a 20% 
decline in the US dollar effective exchange rate on 
12  “The income implications of rising U.S international liabilities”, New York Fed “current issues in economics and finance”, December 2005.
13  “US and global imbalances: can dark matter prevent a big bang ?” R. Hausmann and F. Sturzenegger, Kennedy School of Government, November 2005.Banque de France • Occasional papers • No. 1 • February 2006  13
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the average rate of return of foreign-owned assets 
in the US, we calibrate the shock so as to maintain 
the level of income earned by foreign investors in 
their own currency, assuming that in this case they 
would accept to maintain the same allocation of their 
savings on US assets. An increase in the average rate 
of return on foreign-owned assets by 70 basis points 
would solve the equation. In scenario 2, the positive 
impact of the exchange rate shock on income inflows 
would be more than offset by the increase in outflows, 
resulting in a deterioration (USD 10 billions) in the 
US income balance. 
The interest of such calculations is twofold: first, it 
highlights the fact that the exit strategies focused on 
the valuation impact of exchange rate adjustment 
may be based on an over-optimistic assessment of the 
power of such a channel to solve the US inter-temporal 
budget constraint, if one takes into account the likely 
impact on relative rates of return. Second, it suggests 
that the idea that the “exchange rate adjustment 
scenario” is painless for the United States – who would 
enjoy the positive impact of higher competitiveness 
combined with an increase in the (US dollar value) 
income from investment abroad – is illusory to a 
BOX
Simulations of an exchange rate shock on the US balance of income
Table 1
Scenario 1: 20 % decrease in the US dollar effective exchange rate, no impact on relative rates of return
(amounts in USD billions, rates in %)
Initial situation (2004) 20% decline in US dollar 
exchange rate
Change
Stock of US owned assets abroad (1)   9,972 11,967  1,995 
Income inﬂ  ows (2) 376.5  451.8  +75.3 
Rate of return (2)/(1) 3.8  3.8  0 
Stock of foreign owned assets in the US (1) 12,515 12,515  0 
Income outﬂ  ows (2) 340.2  340.2  0 
Rate of return (2)/(1) 2.7  2.7  0 
Balance of income +36.3  +111.6  +75.3 
Sources: BEA. Banque de France calculation 
Table 2
Scenario 2: 20% decrease in the US dollar effective exchange rate, impact on relative rates of return calibrated so as to ensure 
constant income in their domestic currency to foreign investors
(amounts in USD billions, rates in %)
Initial situation (2004) 20% decline in US dollar 
exchange rate
Change
Stock of US owned assets abroad (1)   9,972 11,967  1,995 
Income inﬂ  ows (2) 376.5  451.8  +75.3 
Rate of return (2)/(1) 3.8  3.8  0 
Stock of foreign owned assets in the US (1) 12,515 12,515  0 
Income outﬂ  ows (2) 340.2  425.5  +85.3 
Rate of return (2)/(1) 2.7  3.4  +0.7 
Balance of income +36.3  +26.3  -10.0 
Sources: BEA. Banque de France calculations 
The IIP ﬁ  gures are computed with FDIs at market value14  Banque de France • Occasional papers • No. 1 • February 2006
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large extent. US investors at home would probably 
be faced with an increase in their financing costs. 
True, the US dollar depreciation in 2003 and 2004 did 
not trigger such a big increase in US average interest 
rates. However, if a continuying US dollar depreciation 
becomes an anticipated feature on the global financial 
market, some impact is likely to be felt.
Indeed, another key question is the speed at which 
this adjustment would occur. According to the work of 
Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa14, the pace of depreciation 
could be relatively slow, following the dynamics of the 
increase in US net external debt. Yet, such an orderly 
adjustment does not exactly match the usual behaviour 
of foreign exchange markets, whose attitude is often 
binary, i.e. discarding long-term rebalancing effects in 
their day-to-day assessment of the market conditions, 
before suddenly sticking to the most orthodox reading 
of macroeconomic principles. 
True, the international financial system has already 
proved resilient to steep changes in the US dollar 
value, for instance in the mid-1980s, at a time 
when international co-operation triggered a swift 
decline in the US dollar exchange rate contributing 
to an improvement in the US  current account. 
The international financial system is much better 
equipped today to deal with sharp adjustment of 
portfolio values, because of the development of 
hedging and diversification techniques. However, the 
adverse impact on the global economy of an abrupt 
exchange rate adjusment may be especially strong 
as international investors are exceedingly long on 
US dollar-denominated assets. Hence, the “usual” impact 
of a major exchange rate shock on long-term interest 
rates could be magnified by negative wealth effects. 
To provide a numerical assessment of the potential 
negative wealth effects brought about by a US dollar 
adjustment, we have computed the ratio of the stock 
of US assets owned by foreigners (at market value) 
to world GDP (in current US dollars). 
Around the mid-1980s, at the time of the Plaza and 
Louvre agreements, foreign-owned assets in the 
United States accounted for roughly 10% of world 
GDP. By 2004, the ratio has reached more than 30%. 
(see chart 16)
4|2 The Asian conversion
In the saving glut model, the key to any exit strategy 
is a conversion of emerging Asian countries to 
a developing path more favourable to domestic 
absorption, whether it stems from higher investment 
or higher consumption, or a combination of both. 
Yet, the reasons why these countries would convert 
to such a model are unclear. In the aftermaths of 
the financial crisis of 1997/1998, these countries 
engaged in a strategy focused on an intensive rather 
than extensive development model, after a period in 
which capital over-accumulation led to a decrease in 
rates of return which explains to a large extent why 
foreign investors fled the area.
As Governor Fischer put it during the Banque 
de France International Symposium15, one must 
generally remain cautious when proposing solutions 
for other economies and, regarding Asia, “investment 
rates in these economies were very high [before 1997], 
and there was considerable evidence that investment was 
not productive at the margin. It is quite likely that the 
current investment situation is the more desirable one”.
Here, as we saw in section 2, we naturally have 
to distinguish between the Chinese issues and the 
questions pertaining to the rest of emerging Asia, as the 
savings/investment behaviour has been fairly different 
in those two sub-groups. In China, there is certainly a 
case for a change in the household savings behaviour, 
which is unlikely to be amendable in the short run, 
Chart 16  Foreign-owned assets 
in the US/world GDP
(in % of world GDP)









Sources: BEA, IMF, Banque de France calculations
14  See: “The US current account and the dollar”, MIT Working Paper 05-02, May 2005.
15 See Banque de France monthly Bulletin, January 2006.Banque de France • Occasional papers • No. 1 • February 2006  15
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as its roots seem to be chiefly structural (under-
developed pension and health insurance schemes).
Finally, even if emerging Asia engaged in a domestic 
demand enhancing policy, its impact on global imbalances 
should not be overstated, as the traction effect of this 
area remains low. This area still is highly dependent on 
extra-regional cyclical developments, whereas its own 
impact on the other regions’ business conditions is rather 
limited, except for Japan (see chart 17). 
4|3 The multi-faceted, 
policy-led approach
The GSG hypothesis describes a situation in which 
economic policy, and namely the US economic policy, 
does not play a major role in the building up of 
imbalances. However, we believe that economic policy 
did play a central role in the present conundrum. 
We have seen earlier that fiscal policy would probably 
have been less stimulative had interest rates not 
reached such low levels, and consequently would 
have weighed on the US current account to a lesser 
degree. Yet, in a speech delivered on 20 April 2005, 
“US current account deficit: causes and consequences”, 
Vice-chairman R. Ferguson concluded that the budget 
deficit’s impact on the current account was almost 
null. The GSG stands on the same ground. 
However, the model used to come to this conclusion16 
is based on the assumption that American households 
behave strongly as Ricardian agents. As a consequence, 
budget deficit shocks only have a very low and 
short-lived impact. The model asserts that a restrictive 
budgetary policy (a tax increase for instance) would 
have a positive impact on households’ consumption 
after three quarters and a weak positive impact on the 
trade balance. It is more likely that it would dampen 
the household consumption in a more persistent way, 
and that the positive impact on the trade balance would 
be stronger thanks to a fall in import demand under 
the hypothesis of a Keynesian behavior of American 
16  “Expansionary fiscal shocks and the trade deficit”, International finance discussion paper 2005-825, Federal Reserve Board, January 2005, Christopher J. Erceg, Luca Guerrieri, Christopher Gust.
Chart 18  US Net lending by sector
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Chart 17  Trade relationships between the 4 main areas of the world economy in 2004
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households, along the lines of the pattern observed in 
the recent period. As shown by chart 18, which plots 
US net lending by sector, household net lending has 
been changing in line with general government net 
lending over the last four years. 
Besides, a more subdued domestic absorption in the 
United States might trigger a change in the economic 
strategy of Emerging Asia. Indeed, so far, Emerging 
Asian countries have not been encouraged to engage 
in a development model based on domestic demand, 
as long as the US could absorb a growing share of Asian 
output thanks to stimulative economic policies. 
Furthermore, the GSG hypothesis does not take into 
account the possible role of monetary policy in the 
widening of US current account deficit and in its 
subsequent reduction. Yet, monetary policy did play 
a role in depressing long-term rates and consequently 
in the deepening of the current deficit. Indeed, it 
had a downward impact on long term interest yields 
during the period of deflation scare, in the first half 
of 2003, when market participants believed in the 
possible implementation of a “plan B” by the Federal 
Reserve, consisting mainly in the purchase of large 
amounts of ten-year Treasury notes. A previous paper 
by Bernanke, with Reinhart and Sack17, found evidence 
testifying for this phenomenon and estimated that “the 
perceived possibility of Treasury purchases had an impact 
of the order of 50 basis points or more” on Treasury 
yields. To conclude on monetary policy ‘s contribution 
to the resolution of global imbalances, it may be worth 
noting that conventional international models, such as 
NIGEM, suggests that, without an increase in interest 
rates, an exchange rate depreciation results in only 
a very small current account improvement. 
Meanwhile, the Euro area and Japan should engage in 
structural reforms in order to boost potential growth. 
This may take time and, in steady states, may not 
reduce imbalances as both imports and exports would 
increase; but it would contribute more to world 
demand and should reduce the recourse to stimulating 
demand policies.
Some may argue that such a scenario creates 
a disproportionate burden on US economic policy. 
However, it should be kept in mind that the 
United States is currently the only major economic 
region for which addressing the national saving issue 
does not bring about a conflict of policy objectives. 
Besides, a simultaneous depreciation of the dollar, 
namely against the currencies that so far have not 
(or little) adjusted to the US dollar would result in 
the adjustment cost being shared with the rest of the 
world.
17  “Monetary policy alternatives at the zero bound : an empirical assessment”, B. Bernanke, V. Reinhart, B. Sack, Finance and Economic Discussion Series 2004-48, Federal Reserve BoardBanque de France • Occasional papers • No. 1 • February 2006  17
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APPENDIX
Description of the data used in 
the corporate net lending calculations
We chose to use data on the corporate non-financial 
non-farm sector for the net lending calculations in 
the US non-financial business sector since:
• this is the closest sector to the euro area non-financial 
corporate sector;
• this is the most statistically detailed business sector 
(the non-financial business sector does not include 
FDIs data for instance).
Nevertheless, for the investment rate calculation, 
the value added relates to the whole non-financial 
corporate sector, since it comes from the national 
accounts and not from the Flow of funds, while the 
gross fixed capital formation relates to the non-farm 
non-financial corporate sector.
For all the sectors and areas mentioned, we computed 
the net lending/ borrowing as the gross saving minus 
the gross investment.
• for the US corporate non-financial non-farm sector, 
total internal funds + IVA were used as a measure 
of gross saving and capital expenditures as a measure 
of gross investment. It is also equivalent to computing 
the net financial investment (net acquisition of 
financial assets minus net increase in liabilities). 
Nevertheless, the discrepancy between the two sides 
is significant. Therefore, we chose to focus on the 
saving/capex side.
• there is no discrepancy in the euro area investment 
and savings accounts at a similar level of detail. 
Therefore, it is totally equivalent to compute net 
lending as the net financial investment or as the gross 
saving minus capex (indeed, it is the gross saving 
plus the net capital transfers minus the gross fixed 
capital formation, the changes in inventories and the 
acquisition of non-produced non-financial assets).
We did not compute a net lending for the US financial 
sector since the aggregated sector does not exist in 
the Flow of funds. It does not seem very relevant to 
rebuild one, since when going into the detailed sub-
sectors, discrepancies are rather large.
A foreign direct investment is defined as a purchase 
by a single foreign (resp. US) investor that results 
in ownership of 10 percent or more of the US (resp. 
foreign) firm’s outstanding equity, or an equivalent 
ownership interest of an unincorporated business 
enterprise. Otherwise, it is considered as a portfolio 
investment. Provisions of loans to US (resp. foreign) 
affiliates are also included in the FDIs.
The underlying sources for the FDIs data are published 
in the Survey of Current Business (BEA).
• in the net lending and investment rate calculations, 
FDIs relate to the non-farm non-financial corporate 
business sector. Funding corporations, among other 
institutions, are therefore excluded.
• in the rates of return calculations, FDIs stem from 
the US position. They consequently relate to the whole 
economy. There are three methods of valuation: the 
historical cost (based on book value), the current 
cost (based on current cost of plant and equipment, 
land and inventories) and the market value (based on 
current stock market prices). To compute the rates 
of return, we used the market value, so that FDIs are 
not too much undervalued.